CONCLUSION

Chinese Climate Policy: An Assessment

As the Chinese economy grew roughly 42% in the past five years, Chinese carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions grew 2%–5%.  From 2014–2016, according to several estimates, Chinese CO2 emissions fell.[1]

Several factors contributed to the partial decoupling of Chinese economic growth and emissions growth. Structural shifts in the economy (from manufacturing to services) played an important role. Government policies—including policies to replace coal with cleaner energy sources—played an important role as well.[2]

Based on the review of Chinese climate policies in this Guide, I offer five observations:

First, the Chinese government is taking significant steps to address climate change.

Steps the Chinese government is taking to address climate change include:

Cutting Coal Consumption. Reducing coal’s role in China’s economy is a goal of the Chinese government. Policies and programs for achieving that goal include:

  • Five-Year Plan targets for limiting coal use,
  • programs to phase out coal heating in much of northern China,
  • programs to shut down inefficient coal power plants, boilers and furnaces,
  • coal power plant efficiency standards, and
  • market-based reforms that weaken coal’s historic dominance in power generation.[3]

These policies have helped deliver results. Chinese coal consumption is roughly 3% lower than its peak in 2013. Structural shifts in the economy and a cyclical downturn in some industries contributed this decline, but Chinese government policies have been a key factor.[4]

Deploying Low-Carbon Power. The Chinese government is committed to significant growth in solar power, wind power, hydropower and nuclear power. Policies for accomplishing those goals include:

  • Five-Year Plan targets with ambitious deployment goals,
  • generous feed-in tariffs for wind and solar power for much of the past decade (now being replaced with an auction system and other market mechanisms),
  • requirements that grid companies purchase minimum amounts of renewable power,
  • help assembling land and arranging for transmission connections at new nuclear power plant sites, and
  • cheap debt capital and waivers of dividend payments for the state-owned companies developing nuclear power plants.

These policies have delivered results. In 2018, China led the world in deployment of solar power, wind power and hydropower—by far. Seven of the nine nuclear power plants in the world that connected to the grid for the first time in 2018 were in China. Continued deployment of low-carbon power will be essential to reducing coal’s role in China’s power sector.[5]

Putting a Price on Carbon Emissions. The Chinese government is implementing a program to put a price on CO2 emissions. CO2 trading programs—some dating back to 2013—are operating in eight cities and provinces. A nationwide CO2 trading program for the power sector was launched at the end of 2017.

China’s CO2 emissions trading program is still under development. Important questions about the program remain. (Are sufficient plant-level emissions data available to run the program adequately? At what level will the cap be set? How will the program be enforced?) But the program has the potential to be an important tool for limiting Chinese emissions.[6]

Improving Energy Efficiency. Improving energy efficiency is a long-standing goal of the Chinese government. The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) contains a mandatory target to improve energy efficiency 15% from 2015 levels by 2020. This and other national energy efficiency targets are implemented through provincial targets, government spending, regulations and standards. The Chinese government sets energy efficiency standards for appliances, vehicles, buildings, businesses, coal-fired power plants and more.[7]

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), energy efficiency improvements since 2000 reduced China’s 2017 emissions by nearly 1.2 Gt CO2e (roughly equal to Japan’s 2017 emissions). In 2016, IEA wrote that “Policies put in place by the [Chinese] government to improve efficiency have been one of the most important factors in limiting the growth of energy-related CO2 emissions anywhere in the world over the past decade.”[8]

Adopting Many Other Policies. The Chinese government has dozens of other policies that reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases. These include policies to:

  • build mass transit,
  • promote green finance,
  • accelerate destruction of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), a superpollutant used in refrigeration and air conditioning,
  • develop HFC alternatives,
  • conserve forests and grasslands, and
  • plant trees on a mass scale.[9]

Committing to Peak CO2 Emissions by 2030. The Chinese government’s highest-profile climate change goal is “to achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emissions around 2030, making best efforts to peak early.”[10]

Some experts have debated the ambition of that goal.

In one respect, the 2030 peaking goal is not especially ambitious. Many recent forecasts project that Chinese carbon dioxide emissions are likely to peak several years before 2030. Some forecasts project peaking could occur as early as the first part of the next decade. Chinese leaders do not generally make international commitments without confidence they can meet them.[11]

Yet when the Chinese government made this pledge in 2014, leading studies indicated that China could peak CO2 emissions before 2030 only with significant additional policy action. To meet its 2030 peaking goal, the Chinese government adopted additional policies that address climate during the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) and will need to take even further action in the 14th Five-Year Plan. Policies that limit CO2 emissions are central to China’s ability to meet its 2030 peaking goal.[12]

Furthermore, the peaking of China’s CO2 emissions will occur when China’s GDP per capita is projected to be in the range of $22,000–$26,000 (depending on when in the 2020s peaking occurs, structural transformations in the Chinese economy and the GDP growth rate). In contrast, the peaking of CO2 emissions for the United States happened when GDP per capita was roughly $42,000 per capita (in 2005), for Japan when GDP per capita was roughly $37,000 per capita (in 2007) and for OECD countries as a whole when GDP per capita was roughly $31,000 (in 2007). (All figures are in PPP 2005$.) In this respect the timing of China’s emissions compares favorably to other leading emitters in terms of ambition.[13]

Speaking Publicly on Climate Change. In their public statements, President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders send the message that climate change is real, that they are serious about addressing it and that doing so is part of China’s development strategy. Calls for low-carbon development are common, including President Xi’s call for a “green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable way of life.”[14] President Xi has said that

“addressing climate change and implementation of sustainable development is not what we are asked to do, but what we really want to do and we will do well.”[15]

At the Paris climate conference in December 2015, President Xi said that China will “build a low-carbon energy system, develop green buildings and low-carbon transportation” and that “tackling climate change is a shared mission for mankind.”[16] In October 2017, after US President Donald Trump’s rejection of the Paris Agreement, President Xi said,

“taking the driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change, China has become an important participant and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization.”[17]

These themes are repeated in many official documents and speeches.[18]

In China’s top-down governance system, leader statements carry great weight in the direction of government policy at all levels. Statements about the importance of addressing climate change shape policies on economic development, energy, urbanization and other topics. Such statements also encourage Chinese citizens in many walks of life to help contribute to solutions to climate change. Harnessing the talents of Chinese engineers, scientists, businesspeople and students—among many others—could make a significant difference in responding to climate change.                        

There are no known climate deniers in the Chinese leadership—and none with any observable influence on policy. In part, this reflects a respect for science and scientists that runs deep in Chinese culture. Indeed, Chinese officials have often expressed puzzlement about statements by some US government officials rejecting the global scientific consensus with respect to climate change.[19]

Image

Second, many Chinese policies that address climate change have multiple objectives. (This is a strength from the standpoint of climate mitigation.)

Chinese official documents identify dozens of policies that help fight climate change, including policies to convert heating from coal to natural gas, scale up renewables, improve vehicle fuel efficiency, protect forests and promote sustainable urbanization.[20] Many of these policies have multiple objectives.

  • Switching from coal to natural gas is central to cleaning the air in China’s cities.
  • Support for solar power, wind power and electric vehicles are part of a strategy to position China for success in industries with growing global markets.
  • Vehicle fuel efficiency and electric vehicle programs reduce China’s oil import dependence.
  • Forestry programs help fight flooding and desertification.
  • Sustainable urbanization programs help make China’s cities more livable.

Many other governments around the world also identify policies with multiple objectives as “climate policies.” In part, this reflects the realities of governance. Important policies rarely have single objectives. In part, it reflects the challenges of climate change as a policy issue. Precisely because climate change is such a challenging policy issue, climate policies will be more durable when aligned with other policy goals.[21]

In his remarks at the Paris climate conference, President Xi Jinping said that China has “integrated climate change efforts into [our] medium- and long-term program of economic and social development.” Continuing to do so will be central to China’s success in addressing climate change.[22]

Third, China’s governance systems have strengths and weaknesses when it comes to addressing climate change.

The Chinese government sets goals far beyond the time frames of many other governments. The “Two Centenary Goals” are perhaps most notable. First articulated in 1997 and given major prominence starting in 2012, they call for China to achieve a “moderately prosperous society” by 2021 and build a “prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” country by 2049. (2021 is the 100-year anniversary of the Communist Party of China. 2049 is the 100-year anniversary of the People’s Republic of China.) In addition, for more than 60 years, Five-Year Plans have guided Chinese policy making over multiyear periods. The Chinese government is currently on its 13th Five-Year Plan. Preparations for its 14th Five-Year Plan are underway.[23]

This capacity for long-term planning offers significant advantages in responding to climate change. Solutions to climate change involve fundamental changes to energy systems, many of which require years or decades to implement fully. The Chinese government’s demonstrated capacity to establish long-term goals and work successfully to meet them is a significant asset in planning, implementing and sustaining an energy transition.[24]

Other parts of the Chinese governance system are less favorable in addressing climate change.

  • The promotion system for provincial and municipal officials is heavily weighted toward GDP targets. Clean air and clean energy targets typically receive much less weight. This has led to provincial and municipal officials approving construction of coal plants, polluting factories and urban infrastructure that boost GDP in the short term but increase carbon emissions and local pollution. Although clean air and clean energy targets have received more weight in promotion decisions in recent years, the system often still rewards decisions to build carbon-intensive, polluting facilities.[25]
  • In many policy areas, China’s implementation and enforcement systems are still in development. Corruption frustrates enforcement of many laws. Many ministries lack sufficient resources to monitor and enforce compliance with regulations. Although environmental enforcement cases have increased significantly in recent years, ensuring compliance with environmental laws and regulations remains a challenge.[26]
  • Chinese statistical systems face similar issues. Although China’s statistical systems have made enormous strides in the past decade, they too are still in development. Systematic reporting biases can undercut the reliability of results.[27]

Fourth, some Chinese policies run counter to climate change goals.

Many Chinese policies help reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases, as discussed above. However, at least three sets of Chinese policies do the opposite.

Domestic Coal Plant Construction. Significant construction of new coal-fired power plants continues in China. Roughly 30 GW of new capacity was added in each of 2017. (This is equivalent to roughly 60 midsize coal power plants.) Roughly 30 GW of new capacity was added again in 2018. Capacity additions continued at roughly the same pace in the first half of 2019. More than 125 GW of new coal-fired power plant capacity was under construction in China as of mid-2019.[28]

This construction continues despite a number of central government policies to discourage coal use. It continues despite the steep drops in the price of renewable power, which is now cheaper than coal power in many circumstances. It continues even though existing coal plants in China are operating at less than 50% capacity.[29]

Why does the construction continue? In part due to the lack of market-based signals and traditional preferences for coal in China’s electric sector. In part due to the promotion incentives of municipal officials. In part due to the considerable power of China’s coal industry.

In 2018, China’s coal-fired power plants were responsible for roughly 10% of global CO2 emissions. The continued addition of dozens of coal-fired power plants to China’s electric grid each year threatens the ability to meet global climate goals.

Synthetic Natural Gas. Synthetic natural gas (“SNG”) plants convert coal to gas, typically to be piped into cities where the gas produces less local air pollution when burned than coal. The climate change impacts of this process are negative: One recent study found that using synthetic natural gas for electricity and industrial heat generation produces roughly 40%–70% more CO2 emissions than directly burning coal.[30]

As of July 2019, five pilot synthetic natural gas projects were operating in China. Roughly 80 SNG projects were at least nominally in different stages of the development pipeline.[31]

Whether these plants will be built is unclear. SNG plants are expensive and require enormous amounts of water, raising questions about the viability of many projects. Environmental authorities have been reluctant to grant approvals, with none granted in 2018.  Several Five-Year Plan goals for SNG have been missed, and others have been scaled back. SNG production in 2018 (2.3 billion cubic meters) lagged far behind the 13th Five-Year Plan’s annual goal for 2020 (17 billion cubic meters).[32]

However if China’s SNG industry were to take off, the climate change implications could be significant. SNG production of 17 billion cubic meters would result in roughly 72 million metric tons of CO2—roughly 0.75% of China’s 2018 CO2 emissions. SNG production of 60 billion cubic meters (the 2020 goal in the 12th Five-Year Plan) would result in CO2 emissions of more than 250 metric tons—roughly 2.5% of China’s CO2 emissions in 2018.[33]

Overseas Coal-Fired Power Plants. Chinese banks and companies play a leading role in the construction of coal-fired power plants around the world. In the first half of 2019, media outlets reported on Chinese support for new coal-fired power plants in many countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Serbia.[34] As of early 2019, Chinese banks and companies had committed or offered funding to more than 100 GW of power plants abroad (roughly 25% of the power plants under development outside China).[35]

China’s state-owned policy banks provide substantially more support for coal-fired power plants abroad than any other public financial institutions. One study found that “In terms of international financing for future coal plants by state-owned policy banks, China is by far the leader with 44GW of capacity, followed by South Korea with 14GW and Japan with 10GW.” (Multilateral development banks and public financial institutions in North America and Europe have rules that either prohibit or very strictly limit financing of coal-fired power plants.)[36]

Chinese government policies do not limit the type of coal power plant technology that can financed or sold abroad, leaving that decision to host governments. Historically, most of the coal power plants Chinese banks and companies supported abroad had subcritical technologies. This appears to be changing as some host governments seek more advanced technologies.[37]

According to one estimate, coal power plants outside China financed by China Development Bank and China ExIm produce almost 600 million metric tons (MMT) of CO2 each year—more CO2 emissions than all but seven countries in the world. If these plants operate on average for 30 years each, they will cumulatively emit 17.8 Gt of CO2—almost half of global CO2 emissions in 2018.[38]

Fifth, China—like all major emitters—will need to do more for the world to achieve its climate goals.

In the Paris Agreement, more than 190 nations agreed to the goal of:

Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C (3.6°F) above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5° C (2.7° F) above pre-industrial levels.[39]

Before the Paris climate conference, almost all of those nations also submitted national action plans for addressing climate change (known as Nationally Determined Contributions or “NDCs”). However, those plans, taken together, do not put the world on a path toward achieving the agreed 2°C (3.6°F) goal, let alone the more ambitious 1.5°C (2.7°F) goal. If all NDCs were fully implemented, according to one leading study, global average temperatures would increase roughly 3°C (5.4°F) by 2100 and continue increasing after.[40]

To compound the problem, many nations are not fully implementing their NDCs. The European Union, United States, Republic of Korea, Canada and Australia, among others, are all at risk of failing to meet their NDC targets and pledges.[41]

Furthermore, most NDCs describe plans only until 2030. For the world to achieve its climate goals, significant action to reduce emissions will be required after 2030. (Indeed the Paris Agreement calls for “rapid reductions” in emissions after a global peak and net zero emissions during the second half of this century.)[42]

For all these reasons, it is clear the world will need to do much more to meet its climate goals. It is also clear that China must play an important role in these efforts, for several reasons.

First and most obvious, China is the world’s largest emitter of heat-trapping gases. There is no solution to climate change without China.

Second, China has enormous potential to contribute to solutions to climate change. In the past decade, it played a central role in dramatic cost reductions for solar power—a technology with the potential to significantly reduce power sector emissions around the world in the decades ahead. China’s current investments in electric vehicles could play a transformational role for that technology, helping reduce transport sector emissions around the world as well. The Chinese government’s focus on innovation and commitment to clean energy could help generate important discoveries and advances with global impacts in the decades ahead.

Third, many countries look to China’s development model with enormous interest. Countless countries would like to emulate China’s economic miracle. The way China integrates climate change into economic development has the potential to be a model for many countries around the world.

Fourth, China’s activities abroad have considerable emissions impacts. The extent to which Chinese financial institutions and companies support low-carbon infrastructure as opposed to high-carbon infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative will make an enormous difference in global emissions in the decades ahead.[43]

Finally, China will play an important role in climate diplomacy in the next several years and beyond. As the world considers next steps under the Paris Agreement, the Chinese government’s positions and views will be key to shaping a global consensus.[44] 

******

As the world meets the climate challenge in the decades ahead, China’s role will be central.

References

[1] See chapter 1 of this Guide at notes 20-21and Figure 1-7.

[2] See Dabo Guan et al., “Structural decline in China’s CO2 emissions through transitions in industry and energy systems,” Nature Geoscience (July 2, 2018)  at p.5 (“structural changes have been reinforced by policies”); IEA, Global Energy and CO2 Status Report (March 2018) at p.8 (coal-to-gas switching, renewables and nuclear power limited emissions growth).

[3] See chapter 8 of this Guide.

[4] BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2019) at p.45.   

[5] See chapters 9 and 10 of this Guide.

[6] See chapter 6 of this Guide; Noah Kaufman and Jonathan Elkind, “Can CO2 Trading System Avoid the Pitfalls of Other Emissions Trading Schemes?,” Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy (February 2018); Frank Jotzo et al., “China’s emissions trading takes steps towards big ambitions,” Nature Climate Change (April 3, 2018); Robert Stavins, “What Should We Make of China’s Announcement of a National CO2 Trading System?” (January 7, 2018); David Roberts, “China is methodically building the world’s most ambitious carbon market,” Vox (December 27, 2017).

[7] See Chapter 7 of this Guide; “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要”[Outline of 13th Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development], Xinhua News Agency (March 17, 2016) at chapter 2 (item 19), “能源系统效率——单位国内生产总值能耗比 2015 年下降” [13th Five-year Plan on Energy Development] at p.14.

[8] IEA, Energy Efficiency 2018 at p. 145; IEA, Energy Efficiency Market Report 2016 at pp.47–48,

[9] See chapters 14, 15, 16 and 17 of this Guide.

[10] People’s Republic of China, Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (June 2015).

[11] See Josh Gabbatis, “China’s emissions could peak 10 years earlier than Paris climate pledge,” Carbon Brief (July 29, 2019); Feng Hao and Tang Damin, “China could peak carbon emissions in 2023,” China Dialogue (November 23, 2017); Qilin Liu, Qi Lei, Huiming Xu and Jiahai Yuan, “China’s energy revolution strategy into 2030,” Resources, Conservation and Recycling (January 2018); Ye Qi, Nicholas Stern, Wu Tong, Lu Jiaqi and Fergus Green, “China’s post-coal growth,” Nature Geoscience (2016) at pp.564–566.

[12] Nan Zhou et al., “China’s energy and emissions outlook to 2050: Perspectives from bottom-up energy end-use model,” Energy Policy (February 2013); Xiliang Zhang et al., Carbon emissions in China: How far can new efforts bend the curve?, Tsinghua-MIT China Energy and Climate Project (October 2014).

[13] Qi Min, Chai Hua and Qing Xuc, “Modeling an emissions peak in China around 2030,” Advances in Climate Change Research (December 2014) at table 2,. Chinese GDP per capita in December 2018 was $9776 at market exchange rates (CEIC Data) (accessed August 3, 2019). Conversion to 2005 PPP yields approximately $18,250 GDP per capita. If Chinese GDP growth rate averages 5% per year, China’s GDP per capita in 2005 PPP terms in the mid-2020s would be in the range of $22,000–$26,000.

[14] President Xi Jinping, “Speech at UN Geneva Office” (January 18, 2017).

[15] “State Council Information Office briefing on climate change,” China.org.cn (September 19, 2014).

[16] “President Xi’s speech at opening ceremony of Paris climate summit,” China Daily (December 1, 2015),  

[17] “Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress” (October 18, 2017).

[18] See “China to continue efforts to tackle climate change: Premier Li,” XinhuaNet (July 11, 2019); People’s Republic of China, “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution” (June 2015) at p.1; NDRC, “China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change” (2017); National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce, “Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road” (May 8, 2017), https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12479.htm and http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201705/t20170505_413602.htm.

[19] In 1977, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said, “The key to achieving modernization is the development of science and technology.” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, reprinted in “Respect knowledge, respect trained personnel,” China Daily (October 15, 2010). See Geoff Dembecki, “The Convenient Disappearance of Climate Denial in China,” Foreign Policy (May 31, 2017).

[20] See, e.g., NDRC, China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (November 2018); People’s Republic of China, Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (June 2015).

[21] For other government’s policies, see INDCs as communicated by Parties, UNFCCC.

[22] “President Xi’s speech at opening ceremony of Paris climate summit” (December 1, 2015).

[23] On the Two Centenary Goals, see  Shi Jia, “中央文献重要术语译文发布,” [“Translation of Important Terms in the Central Literature”], Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (April 27, 2015).

[24] On energy transitions, see Vaclav Smil, Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects (Praeger, 2010); Richard Rhodes, Energy: A Human History (Simon and Schuster, 2018).

[25] David Bulman, Governing for Growth and the Resilience of the Chinese Communist Party, Harvard Kennedy School (April 2016); Jing Wu et al., “Incentives and Outcomes: China's Environmental Policy,” National Bureau of Economic Research (February 2013); Jun Mai, “Chinese officials in Guizhou told to fight pollution or forget about promotion,” South China Morning Post (December 22, 2017).

[26] David Cyranoski, “Pollution Coverup Exposed in Chinese Provinces,” Nature (May 28, 2019); Dorcas Wong, Environmental Compliance for Businesses in China: Five Major Trends,” China Briefing (November 7, 2018); Peter Corne and Johnny Browaeys, “China Cleans up Its Act on Environmental Enforcement,” The Diplomat (December 9, 2017).

[27] See chapter 1.C of this Guide; Jan Ivar Korsbakken et al., “Uncertainties around reductions in China’s coal use and CO2 emissions” (February 16, 2016) at p.1; Derek Scissors, “China’s Economic Statistics Means Everything and Nothing” (May 24, 2016).

[28] “2018 electricity and other energy statistics” China Energy Portal (January 25, 2019); “2017 electricity and other energy statistics (update of June 2018),” China Energy Portal (June 14, 2018); Carbon Brief Infographics: Global Coal Power (128.65 GW under construction) (accessed August 3, 2019); Christine Shearer et al., Boom and Bust 2019: Tracking the Global Coal Plant Pipeline at p.12; Global Energy Monitor, New Coal-Fired Capacity by Country (July 2019); Christine Shearer et al., Tsunami Warning, CoalSwarm (September 2018).

[29] See IRENA, Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2018 (2019); “Two solar power bases launched in northwestern China,” Xinhua (December 29, 2018) (solar plant in Qinghai selling electricity for less than benchmark price for electricity from coal)

[30] See chapter 12 of this Guide; Yue Qin et al., “Air quality, health, and climate implications of China’s synthetic natural gas development,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the US (April 24, 2017) at table S5.

[31] ARA International Limited, “China Natural Gas Map” (accessed July 30, 2019).

[32] “Most coal-to-gas companies can’t survive,” China Energy News (December 6, 2018); “China Natural Gas Market Review in 2018 and Outlook in 2019,” China Energy News (January 24, 2019) (2.3 billion cubic meters SNG production in 2018); National Energy Administration, “煤炭深加工产业示范‘十三五’规划” [13th Five-Year Plan of National Coal Deep Processing Industry Demonstration] (February 2017).

[33] See chapter 12 of this Guide; Yue Qin et al., “Air quality, health, and climate implications of China’s synthetic natural gas development,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the US (April 24, 2017) (4.25 kg CO2 per cubic meter SNG produced).

[34] “Lanao Kauswagan power station,” SourceWatch (July 19, 2019); “Congratulations Pakistan: Thar coal plant starts producing electricity,” Global Village Space (March 19, 2019); “GCM and POWERCHINA Inks US$4bn Power Deal,” GCM Resources (January 17, 2019); “Construction Resumes on $1.5 Billion Zimbabwe Power Project,” POWER Magazine (March 3, 2019); Ashfaq Ahmed, “Pakistan opens its first coal power plant in the most backward area of Thar,” Gulf News (Aril 10, 2019); Dana Ullman, “When Coal Comes to Paradise,” Foreign Policy (June 9, 2019); Dusan Stojanovic, “China’s Spending Influence in Eastern Europe worries West,” AP News (April 10, 2019); Gary Sands, “How China’s Belt and Road Initiative could lead Vietnam away from renewable energy,” South China Morning Post (June 11, 2019); Jonathan Watts, “Belt and Road summit puts spotlight on Chinese coal funding,” The Guardian (April 25, 2019); Karl Mathiesen, “China scrubs its coal projects from ‘world heritage in danger’ in decision,” Climate Home News (May 7, 2019); Oliver Griffin, “Ncondezi Energy Shares Rise on Agreement With CMEC, General Electric's Swiss Unit,” Morningstar (July 23, 2019); Rangga Prakoso, “Lontar Extension PLTU Operates in September,” Berita Satu (March 29, 2019)

[35] Christine Shearer et al., “China at a Crossroads,” Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (January 2019).

[36] IEEFA, http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/China-at-a-Crossroads_January-2019.pdf at p.3; Paul Baruya, International finance for coal-fired power plants, IEA (April 2017).

[37] K. Sims Gallagher, The Carbon Consequences of China’s Overseas Investments in Coal, Center for International Environment and Resource Policy, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (May 2016)

[38] K. Sims Gallagher, The Carbon Consequences of China’s Overseas Investments in Coal, Center for International Environment and Resource Policy, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University (May 2016); BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2019) at p. 57 (2–18 global emissions from fossil fuels = 33.89 Gt).

[39] Paris Agreement Article 2(1)(a).

[40] Emissions Gap Report 2018, UN Environment Program (November 2018).

[41] Emissions Gap Report 2018, UN Environment Program (November 2018) at p.8; Climate Action Tracker; David Victor et al., “Prove Paris was more than paper promises,” Nature (August 1, 2017).

[42] Paris Agreement Article 4(1).

[43] See chapter 20 of this Guide.

[44] See chapter 19 of this Guide.

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